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ON BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS, BLACK
AMERICANS, AND BLACK WEST INDIANS:
SOME THOUGHTS ON WE WANT WHAT’S OURS
Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown*
We Want What’s Ours: Learning from South Africa’s Land
Restitution Program. By Bernadette Atuahene. Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press. 2014. Pp. viii, 198. $42.50.
Most modern constitutions have eminent domain provisions that man-
date just compensation for forced deprivations of land and require such
deprivations to be for a public use or public purpose.1 The Takings Clause is
a classic example of such a provision.2 The takings literature is essentially
focused on outlining the outer boundaries within which the state can take
property from an owner.3 But there are other takings that have been deemed
“extraordinary”; in such circumstances, the state takes away property with-
out just compensation and simultaneously makes a point about a person or
a group’s standing in the community of citizens.4
As Yale Law professor and leading scholar on property, Carol Rose, has
noted, such takings typically accompany historical moments of great up-
heaval, such as wars, revolutions, or social unrest, and involve a complete
reconfiguration of property rights.5 In the American context, for example,
consider property taken from British loyalists, Native Americans, and Con-
federate slaveholders.6 The point was to express society’s disapproval of
* Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. The
author is a former Schwartz Fellow at the New America Foundation and previously served as
the Chair of the Jamaica Trade Board.
1. See, e.g., Constitucio´n Nacional [Const. Nac.] 1994, § 17 (Arg.); Grudgesetz
[GG] [Constitution] 1949, art. 14 (Ger.), translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/
englisch_gg/index.html [http://perma.cc/NEK9-YUUY]; S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, § 25.
2. U.S. Const. amend. V.
3. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Takings Legislation: A Comment, 20 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 75, 80–84 (1996); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 Cornell L. Rev.
61, 72–93 (1986); Eduardo M. Pen˜alver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due Pro-
cess?, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 305, 314–35 (2012); Carol M. Rose, What Federalism Tells Us About
Takings Jurisprudence, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1681, 1685–89 (2007).
4. Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law,
2000 Utah L. Rev. 1, 6.
5. Id.
6. For a discussion on the seizure of Loyalist property, see James W. Ely Jr., The
Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property Rights 35
(3d ed. 2008), who notes that “the confiscation of Loyalist property continued; indeed, North
Carolina seized Loyalist land as late as 1790.” American takings of Indian land date back to the
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groups deemed “outsider” or disloyal.7 More recently, the destruction of
“Black Wall Street” in the 1921 Tulsa, Oklahoma race riots signified such a
taking—government stood passively by while white thugs destroyed virtually
every black-owned property in the business district.8 The point was clear:
“uppity” blacks were not welcome in the business of capitalism—at least not
as owners. Rose quite rightly notes that extraordinary takings often signal
more terrible things to come. In Tulsa, several black citizens were brutally
butchered shortly after the destruction, which still stands as the most mur-
derous race riot of the twentieth century.9
For Rose, the quintessential example of such an extraordinary taking is
the confiscation of Jewish property in Nazi-occupied Europe.10 Take Kris-
tallnacht, or “the night of the broken glass,” in Germany in 193711: German
citizens, working alongside Nazi-affiliated thugs, destroyed the property of
Jewish citizens, with nary an intervention from the German police.12 By the
time the night was over, German citizens had destroyed the homes and syna-
gogues of the Jewish citizens and thoroughly looted Jewish stores. Their clear
objective was to terrorize Jewish citizens—the unspeakable began shortly
thereafter.
Bernadette Atuahene’s We Want What’s Ours: Learning from South Af-
rica’s Land Restitution Program13 is an extraordinary contribution to the
literature on extraordinary takings. Building on Rose’s work, Atuahene ar-
gues that these takings are undertheorized (p. 23). Atuahene’s concept of
“dignitary takings” sheds light on this literature (p. 3). She appropriates the
metaphor of the “invisible man” from Ralph Ellison’s novel of the same
name,14 in which an unnamed African American man is deemed “invisible.”
earliest days of the nation. See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, Property and Empire: The Law of Imperial-
ism in Johnson v. M’Intosh, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 329, 346 (“The Europeans he portrays are
the self-satisfied and opportunistic landgrabbers . . . nonetheless, their land grabs form the
source of governing law for Marshall’s opinion.”). During the Civil War, Congress passed a
series of “Confiscation Acts” aimed at seizing many forms of Confederate property. See
Silvana R. Siddali, From Property to Person: Slavery and the Confiscation Acts,
1861–1862 251–61 (2005).
7. Rose, supra note 4, at 28.
8. See James S. Hirsch, Riot and Remembrance: The Tulsa Race War and its
Legacy 44, 92 (2002).
9. See id., at 118–19 (noting contemporary sources reporting between thirty and 175
deaths); see also Civil Rights, Oklahoma Historical Society, http://www.okhistory.org/
kids/crviolence [http://perma.cc/PT2G-BRJU] (estimating the death toll between seventy-five
and 100).
10. Carol M. Rose, Racially Restrictive Covenants—Were They Dignity Takings? 13
(March 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (available at http://perma.cc/J25E-9BGF).




13. Bernadette Atuahene is a Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois
Institute of Technology.
14. Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man (Penguin Books 2014) (1952).
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Atuahene argues that the taking of property and dignity deems persons “in-
visible” (pp. 30–31). This effect is especially pronounced when the confisca-
tion of property is used to dehumanize and subjugate the citizens within—
or remove them entirely from—the social contract (pp. 24–29).
In Part I, I summarize the key facets of Atuahene’s argument, with a
particular concentration on her concepts of dignitary takings and property-
induced invisibility. In Part II, I emphasize that Atuahene’s focus on the
displacement of people of color—including blacks, Indians, and coloreds—
in the Gauteng and Western Cape provinces of South Africa echoes Rose’s
discussion of the German Jews of Kristallnacht. Not only real property, but
dignity, was “taken” in both of these processes. But Atuahene’s notion of
dignity takings, while an excellent academic contribution, might also be ap-
plied to the more difficult cases of potential takings from those who now
constitute the majority of poor South Africans—that is, South Africans who
never had even quasi-formal relationships with land. They were, at best,
squatters with no land to take. Nevertheless, they too suffered losses: because
of their skin color, they were denied access to government-subsidized land.
Here, undoubtedly, there is a dignitary affront, but is there a “taking”? Put
differently, does a lost opportunity—that is, an opportunity cost—consti-
tute a taking?15
Ta-Nehisi Coates, whose article on the housing experiences of African-
Americans has received widespread media coverage, would have us believe
so. Although Coates writes about the United States, the applicability of his
logic to South Africa is clear. I juxtapose his approach with that of Atuahene
to review his argument that African Americans should be compensated for
such opportunity costs. The narrative of exclusion of African Americans is
similar in important ways to the narrative of exclusion of black South Afri-
cans. In the United States, these exclusions operated in more subtle ways , at
least in the Northern states,  than they did in South Africa. Unlike South
Africa, the United States did not primarily exclude through explicit state
laws. Instead, exclusion in the United States emerged through racially re-
strictive covenants—private contractual arrangements between neighbors
that barred the sale or rental of certain properties to African Americans.
Unbeknownst to most, these racially restrictive covenants received sig-
nificant support from the federal government. In fact, the federal govern-
ment denied African Americans access to federally-funded mortgage
financing and homes in neighborhoods without racially restrictive covenants
for many years. Because this denial of access undermined the capability of
African Americans to build net worth, Coates believes that compensation is
due. While the methodology of exclusion might have been different in South
Africa, the segregationist goals and the results were similar: many African
Americans are, at best, marginal property owners, and their net worth is
low. The applicability of Coates’s logic to Atuahene’s South Africa is clear.
15. In this piece, I focus on the loss of dignity, but there are other ways to characterize
these losses—the opportunity-cost framework associated with economics is one such
mechanism.
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We might imagine the possibility that, absent such exclusions, a resili-
ent, home-owning class of African Americans might have developed. Indeed,
there is another group that we have not addressed: blacks who actually be-
came robust, as opposed to marginal, landowners, accumulated cash, and
bought precisely what they wanted—mostly where they wanted. It is this
group that is the subject of my own work and of Part III—namely, the cash-
rich black migrants from the British West Indies who came to New York and
quickly became property owners.
In Part III, I include the employment experiences of West Indians in
early twentieth-century New York. While this Review is primarily about
property-based discrimination, these employment narratives allow us to see
Atuahene’s dignitary affronts in a new light.  Through these West Indians,
we can imagine how Coates’s narrative might have been different.  West In-
dians were able to buy property in spite of federal exclusions from financing
subsidies because they had cash; they illustrate what might have been possi-
ble for African-Americans, but for such exclusions. Indeed, long before West
Indians were buying into neighborhoods governed by racially restrictive cov-
enants, they were working in factories where blacks were not welcome. A
workplace sign saying “Negroes need not apply” constituted a dignitary af-
front—the employment equivalent of a racially restrictive covenant.
The property story is a similar one: just as West Indians were working in
racially exclusive factories, they were living in racially exclusive neighbor-
hoods. Herein lies the difference with African Americans: these West Indians
had cash, and even virulent racists became pragmatic sellers when faced
with black buyers who were willing to pay a premium to access neighbor-
hoods that had previously been off-limits.
Where did this cash come from? The genesis of West Indian wealth re-
flects a significant difference in the historical trajectories of West Indians
and African Americans. Following emancipation in the British West Indies,
many black West Indians were able to acquire land from the British, become
property holders in their own rights, and subsequently use this property to
build wealth. Given the reality of post-Reconstruction racism, most African
Americans were not able to become early property holders, and their later
exclusions from federal mortgage subsidies only compounded this early
landlessness.
The experiences of West Indians in New York illustrate how it might
have been possible for that group to experience dignitary affronts a la
Atuahene, even as they roughly escaped the takings that often accompany
these affronts. Neither blacks in South Africa nor blacks in the United States
were as fortunate. Indeed, for African Americans and South Africans of
color, Atuahene’s concerns have never been so pertinent.
I. South Africans
When a state takes property, the appropriate remedy has typically been
to provide “just compensation,” which is usually tied to the market value of
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the property confiscated.16 Property law professors generally write about
land or fungible things, such as money, that can compensate for the loss of
land.17 Property scholar Margaret Radin’s emphasis on a “personhood” ap-
proach introduced a now-accepted distinction between property that has ac-
quired personal significance (for example, a wedding ring) and property that
retains merely instrumental value (for example, money).18 Thanks to Radin,
we now also understand that persons may become bound up in things, in-
cluding land, in a manner that is constitutive of the self. To respect per-
sonhood, we accord persons broad liberty with respect to their control over
things.19 But even with this recognition, when things that embody per-
sonhood are taken away, we typically do not speak about anything other
than money.20 As property scholars, we have only recently begun to recog-
nize those aspects of property that implicate personhood.
This recognition has important implications. Channelling Radin, we
recognize that the confiscation of a lifelong home would be more devastat-
ing to most people than the confiscation of a commercial property; after all,
a commercial property has monetary value, but does not typically carry life-
long memories. We now recognize that there are some aspects of property
that we cannot capture in strictly monetary terms.21 For the owner of the
property, the lifelong home is not fungible with the commercial property,
even if they technically have the same value. Yet, even with this recognition,
the most we typically ask as property scholars is the following: Is the differ-
ence between the two objects quantifiable? And, if so, how much more
should the state pay? Even if we recognize aspects of property that may not
be captured in a monetary way, we typically do not have non-monetary
mechanisms for acknowledging this value.
Atuahene has bravely wandered into even more difficult territory. If we
still have difficulty capturing “personhood value,” how might we begin to
capture “dignitary value”? She is interested in compensation for dignitary
wrongs, and she wants more than money. To return to the fundamental
question: What happens when the state does more than simply take prop-
erty? What happens when the state also “takes dignity”? In such instances,
the question becomes whether just compensation, as traditionally under-
stood, is enough.
For Atuahene, the answer is decidedly “no.” She elucidates this through
a detailed qualitative field study of the land restitution program in post-
apartheid South Africa (Chapter Three). Involving tens of thousands of
claimants, this program is the most ambitious of the last few decades (p. 62
n.27). While there have been other programs of this kind—involving indige-
nous peoples in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, for example—these
16. Joseph Singer et al., Property Law 1162 (6th ed. 2014).
17. Id.
18. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 959–60 (1982).
19. Id. at 960.
20. See id. at 961.
21. See id. at 959–60.
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programs involved far fewer people.22 For an ambitious program, Atuahene
writes an ambitious book—the appropriately titled We Want What’s Ours is
equal to the task.
What do dignitary takings mean on the ground? In a detailed ethnogra-
phy, Atuahene interviews displaced South Africans. She documents their
lives in rich detail, both before and after the displacement that inevitably
followed the forced-removal policies implemented by the apartheid state.
The narrative is familiar: to ensure that South Africans lived in racially ho-
mogenous communities, the government conducted an aggressive program
of displacement—one that actually began during colonial times, before the
formal announcement of an apartheid, or “separate,”23 regime (pp. 7–12).
In South African apartheid, blacks were moved to “black homelands” or
“townships,” “coloureds” were moved to “coloured areas,” and so forth (pp.
7–12). Prior to apartheid, many of these communities had been highly di-
verse24: Indian Hindus lived beside Christian coloureds, who lived beside
blacks from a rich array of African tribal groups (pp. 114–15). Atuahene
provides rich accounts of economic livelihoods forged from subsistence
farming on simple, but highly valued, plots of land. These livelihoods were
supplemented by a barter economy within a tightly knit community; people
relied on neighbors to provide services, such as babysitting, in kind when
they were unable to pay for them in cash.25
In a particularly memorable line, one respondent characterizes his loss
as multigenerational—a taking of not only the consequences of his work,
but also the work of his father and grandfather. In his words, “they took all
what I had” (p. 42). Moreover, for these people, displacement constituted far
more than a simple economic loss. The long-term social and psychological
consequences of displacement from the property and the communities that
anchored them was devastating. Atuahene exactingly recounts the common
perception that the relocated will never recover from the upheaval (pp.
164–65). For these people, land is not enough. Money is not enough.
Atuahene’s central contribution is to insist that any “just compensation”
procedure must simultaneously involve a process that she terms “dignity res-
toration” (pp. 3–4). Narratives must be told and heard; suffering must be
acknowledged by the state. Going forward, petitioners for justice (“claim-
ants”) must have a primary say as to where they will live.26 Moreover, claim-
ants should also help direct state-related land policies to ensure that such
policies are properly tailored to restoring their particular psychosocial health
22. See pp. 3, 14, 65; Derick Fay & Deborah James, Giving Land Back or Righting
Wrongs?: Comparative Issues in the Study of Land Restitution, in Land, Memory, Reconstruc-
tion, and Justice: Perspectives on Land Claims in South Africa 41, 52, 55 (Cherryl
Walker et al. eds., 2010).
23. Apartheid, 1 The Oxford English Dictionary 542 (2d ed. 1989).
24. See David Welsh, The Rise and Fall of Apartheid 55 (2009).
25. Here, Atuahene offers a particularly rich account of a communal approach to a sub-
sistence economy. Pp. 42–45.
26. See pp. 173, 175.
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needs and sustaining their livelihoods.27 By any account, these are serious
objectives that make traditional reparations look like small stuff.
The first post-apartheid, multiracial, democratic government led by
Mandela came close to realizing the ideal of “dignity restoration” through
the land-restitution process it established. The South African Constitution
mandates that “[a] person or community dispossessed of property . . . as a
result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled . . . either to
restitution of that property or to equitable redress.”28 The statutory agency
responsible for the execution of this charge was the Commission on Restitu-
tion of Land Rights (“the Commission”) (p. 13). Atuahene contends that the
architects of the Commission were inspired, in part, by the recognition that
money and land alone would not suffice for redress (p. 60). Indeed,
Atuahene goes further. She defines reparations, drawing heavily on the
United Nations’ definition, as “the right to have restored to them property
of which they were deprived . . . and to be compensated appropriately for
any such property that cannot be restored to them.”29 To be blunt, repara-
tions are about land and, if not land, money. Atuahene argues that “the
architects of the restitution process made an intentional turn away from rep-
arations to embrace the more robust project of dignity restoration” (p. 58).
In that project, land and money were important, but dignity was equally
important (p. 58). Though, the architects may not have used the term “dig-
nity restoration,” that was precisely what they were doing.
Building on her field research, Atuahene envisions an ideal commission
where leaders of displaced communities play key roles in the land-restitution
process (pp. 107–08). These leaders form claimants’ committees, which are
empowered to represent their communities before land-restitution officials
(p. 119), and “run interference” between their former neighbors and land-
restitution officials (p. 119). The committees are designed to facilitate com-
munication; they guide fellow claimants through the complex process of
lodging claims, having such claims validated and verified, and ultimately
negotiating with land-restitution officials (p. 124). Notably, the process is
central—indeed, it is largely through the process, with its emphasis on com-
munity involvement, instructive communication between claimants, and
claimants themselves spearheading communication, that dignity is restored
(p. 108). This is precisely what the Commission claimed to be trying to do.30
But in many ways, the actual Commission fell short of this goal. The
land-restitution board was a classic resource-constrained bureaucracy, the
27. See pp. 110 (“[B]y denying Sophiatown residents the opportunity to have a true voice
in determining their compensation, the post-apartheid state behaved like the apartheid regime
. . . .”).
28. S. Afr. Const., 1996, ch. 2, § 25(7).
29. P. 4 (quoting Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, at
126, U.N. Doc. A/51/18 (1996)).
30. African Nat’l Cong., Policy on Restitution of Land Rights, African National Con-
gress http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=228 [perma.cc/L95F-UJQG].
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challenges of which were only compounded by the fact that it was in a devel-
oping country (p. 92). Claimants constantly complained that only the bet-
ter-resourced and socially connected community members were able to
negotiate the bureaucracy.31 Those with more resources saw their claims
processed faster, fuelling speculation about favoritism.32 Moreover, since the
Commission was originally constituted for only a ten-year term—in hind-
sight, too short a mandate—it faced the prospect of an ever-looming dead-
line (p. 92). As the Commission’s expiration deadline approached,
complaints about the Commission by panicked claimants amplified, and its
focus turned to efficiency.33 Facing a pending deadline, the commissioners,
Atuahene writes, implicitly decided to process as many claims as possible (p.
165).  The commission had to choose between efficiency and dignity; effi-
ciency won.
This is understandable. Bureaucracies across the world have to justify
their funding and, indeed, their very existence.34 They are staffed by bureau-
crats who need some way to quantify what they have accomplished. What
better way to demonstrate success than by tallying the number of claims
processed? Atuahene contends that this quantitative orientation skewed the
process.35 Financial claims were more easily processed than land claims (p.
92). Thus, claimants were directed to financial claims, as opposed to land
claims, and many were encouraged to change their pending land claims into
financial claims (p. 92).
This practice is problematic for several reasons. First, a dignity-restora-
tion process has to honor the preferences of the claimants. Those who ap-
plied for land presumably wanted land. To massage their preferences so that
they accept money rather than land does not sufficiently respect their dig-
nity. Moreover, awarding land rather than money would have made it more
likely that the original communities would have been reconstituted and, in
turn, that would have made it more likely that the original community
members would have actually returned to these communities. Given the
goals articulated by Atuahene—which she contends were shared by the ar-
chitects of the Commission—it is ironic that as the Commission’s expiration
approached, the process boiled down to money (p. 93). At that point, even
land seemed too complicated to process—and nary a word for dignity.
31. Cf. pp. 139–41 (discussing the benefits to wealthy or well-connected individuals of
having a lawyer negotiate the restitution process).
32. See pp. 140–41 (citing an example of how the skilled work of an attorney resulted in
a dispossessed community “taking back” the old homes that had been rented out to whites by
the municipality).
33. Cf. Comm’n on Restitution of Land Rights, Annual Report 2014/2015 6
(2015), available at https://perma.cc/B5GM-CAZP (noting that the South African government
in 2014 responded to calls from citizens who had missed the initial deadline to reopen the
restitution program for a period of five years).
34. See, e.g. id.; see also Kaifeng Yang & Marc Holzer, The Performance-Trust Link: Impli-
cations for Performance Measurement, 66 Pub. Admin. Rev. 114, 114–15 (2006).
35. See pp. 92 (“Since providing financial awards was quicker than other options, the
commission focused on financial compensation in those early years.”).
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This is precisely what Atuahene contends that a dignity-restoration pro-
cess should not be doing. With the benefit of hindsight, one wonders if the
focus on money as the primary mechanism of redress was perhaps inevita-
ble. That is, in part, the subject of the remainder of this Review.
At this point, I am going to do something unusual for a Review. I am
going to shift focus from Atuahene’s primary subject area—those who were
dispossessed of land—to South Africans who had no land in the first place.
These South Africans did not have suffer takings, at least in the way that we
traditionally think of the word, because nothing tangible was taken from
them. The definition of a “right in land” included in the Act establishing the
Commission process was expansive; indeed, the Commission was empow-
ered to consider:
[A]ny right in land whether registered or unregistered, and may include the
interest of a labour tenant and sharecropper, a customary law interest, the
interest of a beneficiary under a trust arrangement and beneficial occupa-
tion for a continuous period of not less than 10 years prior to the dispos-
session in question.36
But as Atuahene notes, many persons were unaware of the Act’s broad
scope and did not believe that it applied to them (p. 76). Moreover, many
would have undoubtedly been unable to compile documentation or solicit
oral testimony from former neighbors to demonstrate their connections to
land, particularly in conditions of extreme poverty. Nevertheless, no one
disputes that dislocation would have caused these people—even if they were
relatively transient tenants—significant financial losses (pp. 42–45). At a
minimum, they suffered significant opportunity costs—namely, the poten-
tial net worth these individuals lost when the government excluded them
from the often-subsidized acquisition and leasing opportunities granted to
their white compatriots.37
These opportunity costs are particularly important. By all accounts, the
number of South Africans who had no formal legal land claims to begin
with—even under the aforementioned, expansive definitions of formal land
claims,  rendering them “squatters” in the apartheid legal system—was
much larger than the number of South Africans who were deprived of land
when they were displaced.38 They constitute many of the South African poor
36. Pp. 75–76 (quoting Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act, § 2(f) (Act
No. 63/1997) (S. Afr.) (amending Restitution of Land Rights Act, § 1 (Act No. 22/1994) (S.
Afr.))).
37. Bradley Skelcher, Apartheid and the Removal of Black Spots from Lake Bhangazi in
Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa, 33 J. Black Stud. 761, 770 (2003) (explaining that, because a
vast majority of government-subsidized land was allocated for white-only use, Africans were
denied the opportunity to acquire title that was afforded to whites).
38. See id. at 770–71 (pointing to the Natives Land Act, which limited the percentage of
land for Africans to 13% and the comments from Reverend Mtimkulu from Zululand that
“[m]any natives . . . have already been removed from the farms on account of this Act. . . .
There are others who have farms, but titles are refused them by the Government.” (citing
Colin Bundy, Land, Law and Power: Forced Removals in Historical Context, in No Place to
1046 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:1037
today.39 So here is the question: What about people who were effectively
landless in legal terms—that is, persons who never had a quasi-formal rela-
tionship with land to begin with, but who would have most likely received
land and government subsidies had they been white? Does the concept of
“dignity takings” include them? In the next Part, I consider this question
through the lens of the African American experience. I explore the work of
Ta-Nehisi Coates, and I also discuss my own work on the property-buying
and owning experiences of Afro-Caribbean migrants to the United States
and their predecessors in the West Indies.
II. African Americans
Broadening the discussion of “dignitary takings” to identify its implica-
tions for the landless gives Atuahene’s arguments particular resonance today.
Both South Africa and the United States shared a period of separate but
ostensibly equal—apartheid in South Africa and Jim Crow in the United
States—in which a large number of landless blacks were deprived of the
opportunity  granted to whites to acquire land and homes aided by govern-
ment subsidy. In South Africa, the subsidies for whites were direct. In an
effort to constitute white communities, the government reduced prices for
whites who wanted to acquire land.40 In the United States, the process was
more discreet and the motives less blatant: the government offered mortgage
subsidies to facilitate the purchase of homes by middle-class Americans.41
For myriad reasons, including securing the support of southern senators, the
government drafted rules that ensured blacks did not qualify for mortgage
subsidies.42 This rendered such programs essentially whites only, excluding
racial minority groups like Hispanics.
Indeed, Atuahene’s contribution could not come at a more timely mo-
ment. Right now there is tremendous discussion about what, precisely, the
government owes blacks who were deprived access to publicly subsidized
financing for housing. The Obama Administration recently moved to ensure
that this history is not repeated.43 However, some still claim that the presi-
dent has not done enough to compensate those who suffered calculable,
Rest: Forced Removals and the Law in South Africa 3, 7 (Christina Murray & Catherine
O’Regan eds., 1990))).
39. See African Nat’l Cong., supra note 30.
40. Bernadette Atuahene, South Africa’s Land Reform Crisis: Eliminating the Legacy of
Apartheid, 90 Foreign Aff. 121, 124–25 (2001).
41. See Charles Abrams, Forbidden Neighbors: A Study of Prejudice in Housing
148–49, 151 (1955) (discussing the “government-supported program[s]” that encouraged the
middle class to cluster in the suburbs and enabled them to afford homes).
42. See id. at 240.
43. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Binyamin Appelbaum, Obama Unveils Stricter Rules Against
Segregation in Housing, N.Y. Times (July 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/us/
hud-issuing-new-rules-to-fight-segregation.html [http://perma.cc/3EAY-99WK].
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monetary harms due to federal-financing exclusions because of their race.44
The critics argue, essentially, if someone would have been able to buy a
house but for his or her exclusion from federal mortgage financing, and he
or she can quantify what he or she has lost in net worth as a result, the
federal government has an obligation to cover the difference. Ta-Nehisi
Coates eloquently champions this view in “The Case for Reparations”
(“Reparations”). In that piece, Coates is concerned with dignity, but even
more so, he is concerned with cash.45 In this Part, I lay out Coates’s argu-
ment in more depth before turning to my own work on another group of
blacks—black, West Indian migrants to New York.
Coates’s Reparations is a recent contribution to the Atlantic Monthly,
and it has become the most widely read piece in the history of the maga-
zine.46 I write about it partly because it has garnered a broad readership, but
also because the essay can profitably be read through the lens of takings
scholarship. Although Coates is not a property scholar, the piece is almost
entirely about the taking of property from African Americans.
Coates’s fundamental point is that, when we focus on what was taken
from African Americans, we too often gloss over what economists call “op-
portunity costs.”47 In these instances, property was not actually taken, but
44. E.g., Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Champion Barack Obama: How Black American Talks to
the White House, Atlantic (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/
01/the-champion-barack-obama/283458/ [http://perma.cc/X8BN-LXYC]. Coates is particu-
larly critical of President Obama’s repeated speeches urging personal responsibility in the
black community, which he sees as sidestepping the fundamental issue—namely, the ongoing
effects of past exclusions. Id. His point is that even those who have lived lives of exemplary
personal responsibility (such as Clyde Ross, discussed infra) found it difficult to mitigate the
effects of exclusions from federal mortgage-financing schemes and the resulting condemnation
to segregated, high-poverty communities. But see Jonathan Chait, Barack Obama, Ta-Nehisi
Coates, Poverty, and Culture, N.Y. Mag. (Mar. 19, 2014, 11:11 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/
intelligencer/2014/03/obama-ta-nehisi-coates-poverty-and-culture.html [http://perma.cc/
VSL7-2U6S] (“But Coates is committing a fallacy by assuming that Obama’s exhortations to
the black community amount to a belief that personal responsibility accounts for a major
share of the blame.”).
45. Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, Atlantic, June 2014, at 54, 70, http://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/ [https://
perma.cc/L6ZU-BSGA]; cf. Benjamin Wallace-Wells, The Hard Truths of Ta-Nehisi Coates, N.Y.
Mag., July 2015, at 24, 29, http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/07/ta-nehisi-coates-be-
tween-the-world-and-me.html [http://perma.cc/4UG7-WHX6] (discussing Coates’s disagree-
ment with President Obama about whether change can be achieved through the efforts of the
black community alone). But cf. Rod Dreher, Ta-Nehisi Coates’s Holy Writ, The Am. Con-
servative (Aug. 12, 2015, 12:07 PM), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/ta-
nehisi-coatess-holy-writ/ [http://perma.cc/S53P-JRRW] (describing Coates’s The Case for Rep-
arations as “absurd and unworkable, and a form of despair”).
46. Univ. of Chi., Inst. of Politics, IOP - Ta-Nehisi Coates on The Case for Reparations,
YouTube (Nov. 14, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FUdYZTM4ens [http://
perma.cc/XFM9-RHGL].
47. Coates, supra note 45, at 58 (citing, for example, the practice of “redlining” African
American neighborhoods, rendering properties in these areas ineligible for FHA-backed
mortgages).
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the opportunity to acquire property was never given in the first place. Afri-
can Americans have abysmal net worth.48 This is largely because of home-
ownership—a home is the largest asset that an American typically buys.49
And African Americans are significantly less likely to own a home. When
they do, they are more likely to buy lower-value homes in high-poverty,
highly segregated neighborhoods,50 and they are likely subject to more oner-
ous mortgage terms.51
For some time we have seen public recognition that African Americans
experienced “dignitary takings,” and that these takings have long-term con-
sequences for African American wealth acquisition.52 The focus has moved
beyond the actual taking of real property—for example, in post-Reconstruc-
tion race riots—to more subtle takings. Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro
argue that the greatest impediment to African American wealth-acquisition
was their exclusion by the federal government from the largest expansion of
wealth in American history—namely, the post-World War II effort to spur
middle-class homeownership.53 Prior to federal intervention in this area, the
United States was overwhelmingly a country of relatively poor renters, and
this was true for both blacks and whites.54
This expansion in homeownership was spearheaded by the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA), which insured private mortgages to reduce
48. See Thomas M. Shapiro et al., Inst. on Assets & Soc. Policy, The Racial
Wealth Gap Increases Fourfold 1 (2010), https://iasp.brandeis.edu/pdfs/2010/
RWG_FourFold.pdf [https://perma.cc/GP8K-UR5V] (graphing the median wealth holdings of
white and African American families from 1984 to 2007); Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry,
Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along Racial, Ethnic Lines Since End of Great Recession, Pew
Res. Ctr. (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-
gaps-great-recession/ [http://perma.cc/9FXP-YWS2] (graphically showing that the net worth
of whites is thirteen times greater than the net worth of blacks).
49. Laura Shin, The Racial Wealth Gap: Why a Typical White Household Has 16 Times the
Wealth of a Black One, Forbes, March 26, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2015/
03/26/the-racial-wealth-gap-why-a-typical-white-household-has-16-times-the-wealth-of-a-
black-one/ [http://perma.cc/DJ2Z-EJCV] (“For most U.S. families, a home usually comprises
the largest portion of their assets.”).
50. See Emily Rosenbaum & Samantha Friedman, The Housing Divide 121 (2007).
51. Melvin L. Oliver & Thomas M. Shapiro, Black Wealth/White Wealth 8
(Routledge Tenth-Anniversary ed. 2006) (“Banks turn down qualified blacks much more often
for home loans than they do similarly qualified whites. Blacks who do qualify, moreover, pay
higher interest rates on home mortgages than whites.”).
52. Cf., Amartya K. Sen, From Income Inequality to Economic Inequality, in Race, Pov-
erty, and Domestic Policy 59, 59–82 (C. Michael Henry ed., 2d 2013) (drawing a distinc-
tion between income inequality and the broader concept of economic inequality, which
involves “causal influences on individual well-being and freedom that are economic in nature
but that are not captured by the simple statistic of income”).
53. Oliver & Shapiro, supra note 51, at 22.
54. See Wyo. Dep’t of Admin. & Info., Historical Census of Housing Tables: Home Owner-
ship, http://ai.wyo.gov/economic-analysis/cost-of-living-1/wyoming-housing-information/his
torical-census-of-housing-tables-homeownership [http://perma.cc/M3PM-FV9W] (explaining
that, prior to the surge in homeownership following World War II, national homeownership
rates were very low).
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interest rates for the burgeoning middle class.55 The FHA created a color-
coded index which mapped neighborhoods according to their perceived
“stability.”56 African American neighborhoods were almost universally
deemed ineligible for FHA loans.57 Unsurprisingly, a housing expert noted
that the “FHA adopted a racial policy that could well have been culled from
the Nuremberg laws.”58
While this exclusion is consequential, it is unclear whether such an ex-
clusion constituted a taking within the typical sense. This is not an argument
about whether African Americans have suffered takings historically—we
now understand that slaves had a property right in self-ownership.59 Few
modern scholars would debate that when the government passes laws estab-
lishing slavery, it simultaneously transfers this property to slaveowners, leav-
ing slaves to suffer uncompensated takings.60 Moreover, few scholars would
dispute that many African Americans suffered property confiscations during
the post-Reconstruction period that essentially constituted takings.61
The post–World War II period is different. During that era, real prop-
erty was not typically taken from African Americans by the federal govern-
ment, although, state governments are another matter.62 But something
equally insidious happened: African Americans never had the opportunity
to buy property with the subsidized financing that was offered to middle-
class white Americans.63 Was this a taking? Did it have dignitary aspects?
Atuahene’s analysis has significant implications for this argument.
These questions make the juxtaposition of Atuahene and Coates inter-
esting. Coates focuses in large part on one major tool of FHA policy: racially
restrictive covenants. These covenants are subdivision rules that “run with
the land” and bar sales or rentals by African Americans and other minority
55. Coates, supra note 45, at 58. A far more comprehensive history of this period is
included in Abrams’s classic book on the subject. Abrams, supra note 41.
56. Coates, supra note 45, at 58.
57. Id. A leading authority in this area is Charles Abrams. His book, supra note 41, at
73–78, describes the “self-fulfilling prophecy” that has kept minorities in segregated ghettos,
and it has become a standard text for those who study this area. For a summary of the litera-
ture on the FHA’s role in perpetuating racially restrictive covenants, see Richard R. W.
Brooks & Carol M. Rose, Saving the Neighborhood: Racially Restrictive Covenants,
Law, and Social Norms 107–11 (2013) and sources cited therein.
58. Coates, supra note 45, at 58 (quoting housing expert Charles Adams in 1955).
59. E.g., Kaimipono David Wenger, Slavery as a Takings Clause Violation, 53 Am. U. L.
Rev. 191, 198 (2003).
60. See, e.g., id. at 215–21.
61. See, e.g., Coates, supra note 45, at 56–57 (describing state complicity in the takings of
black-owned land in the 1920s).
62. See, e.g., id.
63. See id. at 58.
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groups within the designated areas.64 The covenants are often quintessen-
tially private arrangements; neighbors covenant with one another to secure
promises that they will not sell property to African Americans.65
In their book on racially restrictive covenants, Richard Brooks and Carol
Rose emphasize this point—that it is precisely because racially restrictive
covenants were private that they were  difficult to police.66 The private na-
ture of these covenants meant that the state action usually needed to invoke
civil rights protections seemed to be missing.67 Decades after Shelley v. Krae-
mer,68 which prohibited judicial enforcement of such covenants, scholars are
still considering whether private contractual arrangements become state ac-
tion merely by way of judicial enforcement.69 Understandably, legal scholars
might balk at the notion of a racially restrictive covenant constituting a tak-
ing.70 This is not only because it is unclear what precisely was taken—other
than the important opportunity to buy property—and by whom, but also
because the issue of state involvement remains contested.71
Coates does not express the types of reservations that typically trouble
law professors. For him, racially restrictive covenants—although ostensibly
private—were the lynchpin of government policy.72 State action? Maybe not.
But for him, there is a more important question: Why were racially restric-
tive covenants so important to federal housing policy? First, such covenants
played a significant role in underwriting standards. In fact, the federal gov-
ernment redlined neighborhoods by insisting that only white neighborhoods
could meet the underwriting requirements.73 Second, the federal govern-
ment played a major role in the institutionalization of racially restrictive
covenants by only underwriting mortgages if the properties were governed
by restrictive covenants.74 This is heady stuff. By incentivizing the use of
racially restrictive covenants, the FHA, it was believed, helped protect gov-
ernment interests by ensuring that its loans would not go bad.75 The FHA
presumed that if the neighborhood “turned black,” the loans were more
likely to go under.76
64. Id. at 65.
65. Brooks & Rose, supra note 57, at 1–3.
66. Id. at 4–6.
67. See Rose, supra note 10, at 13–15.
68. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
69. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 10, at 13–15 (summarizing both sides of this debate).
70. See, e.g., id. at 15–17.
71. See, e.g., id. at 13–17.
72. Coates, supra note 45, at 58.
73. Id.; see also Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Seg-
regation and the Making of the Underclass 206 (1993).
74. Coates, supra note 45, at 65.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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And Coates does more: a la Atuahene, he finds real people who were
unable to buy homes or obtain mortgages for this reason.77 Coates follows
the trajectory of Clyde Ross, a military veteran and former sharecropper
who flees the terror of mid-century, Jim Crow Mississippi. Ross’s family
property was seized by the state, ostensibly to compensate the state for a
fictional tax bill—a not uncommon occurrence.78 Indeed, an investigative
series by the Associated Press documented the widespread theft of African
American–owned land dating back to the antebellum period.79 Following
the seizure, Ross subsequently migrated to Chicago.80 In Chicago, he met
property-related indignities reminiscent of Jim Crow, though of a different
sort. Ross sought to purchase a home, but found himself ineligible for a
federal program that provided specially subsidized mortgages to veterans.81
He was unable to buy property in certain neighborhoods because white
homeowners associations precluded his entry.82 The poor supply of housing
forced Ross to buy low-quality housing in a marginal neighborhood. He was
unable to get a federally insured FHA mortgage because his neighborhood
had been redlined.83 When he was finally able to purchase a home, white
flight ensued, driving down the value of his asset. To add insult to injury,
Ross was at the mercy of an obscenely priced vendor’s mortgage.84 Ross
never actually had any property taken from him in Chicago, but he never-
theless lost something. What do we do when we see the loss of dignitary
interests without a formal taking?
To crystallize this point, let’s focus on racially restrictive covenants. We
must first acknowledge that there are important differences between the
losses suffered by Ross and the dignity takings that concern Atuahene. First,
the private property owners who were parties to such covenants were not
particularly concerned with dehumanization—instead, they were typically
trying to maintain their property values, and they remained indifferent to
exclusion.85 Second, racially restrictive covenants generally originated in the
contractual arrangements of private actors.86 Third, restrictive covenants
never removed any actual property owned by African Americans.87 Despite
the clear differences between Atuahene’s subjects, who had property taken,
and Coates’s subjects, who were denied the opportunity to purchase prop-
erty, the results are equally devastating.
77. Id. at 57–58.
78. Id. at 56–57.
79. Id. at 56.
80. Id. at 54–71.
81. See id. at 64.
82. See id. at 65.
83. See id. at 58.
84. See id. at 66.
85. Rose, supra note 10.
86. Id. at 3.
87. Id. at 17.
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Coates’s analysis is simple: surely, we owe African Americans the differ-
ence between what they would have had—calculated using the net worth of
the median American who had access to a program of federally supported
mortgage financing—and what they do have—calculated using the net
worth of the median American who did not have access to such a program.
This assumes, of course, that we can control for other factors.88 Given the
plethora of apartheid-era programs, which assigned and denied land-related
benefits explicitly on the basis of race, the potential applicability of Coates’s
argument to South Africa is evident. The logical question is this: What
would the median net worth of landless South Africans have been had they
had access to the land-related benefits that have undoubtedly helped boost
white South Africans’ net worth?89
If we think of property owners, or potential property owners, from dis-
favored groups on a continuum, we have, to this point, discussed two groups
of subjects. One group includes the Jews of Kristallnacht, who are not unlike
the landed African Americans of Tulsa, who, in turn, are not unlike the
landed South Africans of color discussed by Atuahene. Few scholars would
disagree that these groups all saw their properties either destroyed or seized
and suffered both traditional property takings and dignity takings. The sec-
ond group is the landless, which might include both landless South Africans
and landless African Americans. They may not have had property seized in
the traditional sense, but their opportunity to acquire property was “taken.”
Because this opportunity was denied solely because of their race, they also
experienced a “taking” of their dignity.
There is yet another group on the aforementioned continuum that we
have not addressed. We might imagine the possibility of a third group of
disfavored people: black people who actually became robust landowners. By
virtue of their hard work, these individuals accumulated cash and bought
precisely what they wanted, mostly where they wanted—an opportunity
never afforded to Coates’s subjects or their forebears. It is this group that is
the subject of the next Part.
III. West Indians
In my own work, I have looked at narratives of the home-buying exper-
iences of other dark-skinned Americans of African descent—namely, cash-
rich West Indian migrants.90 I focus on a period in which large numbers of
88. Coates, supra note 45.
89. For a discussion of comparative black-white inequality in South Africa and the
United States, see John Campbell, Black and White Income Inequality in South Africa and the
United States, Council on Foreign Rel. (Sept. 12, 2014), http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2014/
09/12/black-and-white-income-inequality-in-south-africa-and-the-united-states/ [http://
perma.cc/L2KD-MSY3].
90. Indeed, the significant net worth of Caribbean black migrants (as opposed to African
Americans) suggests that Coates might be on to something. See, e.g., Winston James, Explain-
ing Afro-Caribbean Social Mobility in the United States: Beyond the Sowell Thesis, 44 Comp.
Stud. in Soc’y & Hist. 218 (2002); see also Nathan Glazer & Daniel P. Moynihan, Be-
yond the Melting Pot (2d. ed. 1970); Winston James, New Light on Afro-Caribbean Social
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West Indian migrants arrived in New York, between the 1920s and 1950s,
when housing discrimination was still rife.
The implications of this historical West Indian advantage in housing
markets are evident even today.91 And so the question becomes: Why are the
black brownstone owners in Harlem and Brooklyn disproportionately West
Indian? Why are the landlords West Indian American, while the tenants Af-
rican American? These are tough questions. For students of housing dis-
crimination, West Indian Americans have long presented a quandary.92
West Indians, like African Americans, are overwhelmingly dark-skinned
persons of African descent who were enslaved—albeit in the British-colo-
nized West Indies rather than the United States—and are phenotypically in-
distinguishable from African Americans.93 Thus, if it is reasonable to assume
that racial exclusions are consistently applied to persons who are dark-
skinned, one would expect to find that housing discrimination has had simi-
lar effects on West Indians and African Americans.94 As one author notes,
“[L]evels of segregation suggest that the housing and neighborhood charac-
teristics of African Americans and West Indians should be indecipherable.”95
Yet this is not the case. West Indians have clear and well-documented
advantages in housing markets in comparison to African Americans.96
Granted, there may be other factors at play. One sociological study contends
that “the tendency for West Indian households to occupy better-quality
housing and neighborhoods than African Americans directly results from
Mobility in New York City: A Critique of the Sowell Thesis, in New Caribbean Thought 395
(Brian Meeks & Folke Lindahl eds., 2001); Ira De A. Reid, The Negro Immigrant (1969).
Many dark-skinned West Indians who were phenotypically indistinguishable from African
Americans were able to buy property in white neighborhoods simply because they had cash
(from non-federal sources, such as savings brought from their homelands). See Eleanor Marie
Lawrence Brown, The Blacks Who “Got Their Forty Acres”: A Theory of Black West Indian
Migrant Asset Acquisition, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 27, 42 (2014).
91. Rosenbaum & Friedman, supra note 50, at 121 (noting that West Indians enjoy
higher household incomes and “better-quality housing and neighborhoods than African
Americans”); Kyle D. Crowder, Residential Segregation of West Indians in the New York/New
Jersey Metropolitan Area: The Roles of Race and Ethnicity, 33 Int’l Migration Rev. 79, 84
(1999) (noting West Indian advantages in “income, occupation, and education”).
92. See Rosenbaum & Friedman, supra note 50, at 121.
93. I will regularly refer to two groups of blacks. The first group, African Americans
(often pithily referred to in the literature as “native” blacks), includes those descended from
Africans who were enslaved here in the United States. The second group, West Indians, has a
different historical heritage. These are persons who were enslaved in the West Indies but were
not enslaved in the United States. They later became migrants to the United States, mostly
after the abolition of slavery. The term “West Indians” as utilized in this Review does not
generally include West Indian immigrants to the United States of other ethnic backgrounds.
See Calvin B. Holder, West Indies, in The New Americans: A Guide to Immigration Since
1965 674, 674–75 (Mary C. Waters & Reed Ueda eds., 2007) (describing the migration of West
Indians to the United States and identifying the group as racially diverse, but predominantly
black).
94. See Rosenbaum & Friedman, supra note 50, at 121.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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their relative concentration in formerly white middle-class neighborhoods
that had stocks of owner-occupied homes.”97 That is, West Indians were
more likely to buy into “solid,” white neighborhoods.
Despite this advantage, there is no doubt that West Indians experienced
the dignitary affronts to which Atuahene alerts us. Indeed, no one makes
this point better than Malcolm Gladwell. He reflects on the employment
trajectory of his family’s Jamaican co-ethnics shortly after their arrival to
New York in the 1920s.98 As was typical at the time, many of these immi-
grants sought jobs in garment factories.99 These garment factories were typi-
cally segregated; moreover, the segregation was deeply institutionalized, as
evidenced by the existence of separate unions for black and white garment
workers.100 Yet Gladwell notes that West Indians sought and received jobs in
factories with signs proclaiming that “no blacks need apply,” despite being
recognizably dark-skinned persons of African descent.101
While this Review is primarily about property-based discrimination,
these employment narratives allow us to see Atuahene’s dignitary affronts in
a new light. That is, the early experiences of West Indians in New York un-
derscore the possibility for dignitary affronts in employment—for example,
the sign proclaiming that “no blacks need apply”—even as West Indians
managed to escape the economic implications of these affronts. To continue
the metaphor: there were no “takings” of these jobs, since the West Indians
ultimately got jobs, but their dignity was still harmed.
A similar narrative might emerge in the arena of property. To under-
stand the analogies, consider Brooks and Rose’s book, Saving the Neighbor-
hood.102 It tracks the trajectory and persistence of racially restrictive
covenants in particular neighborhoods.103 Brooks and Rose draw upon the
law and social norms literature in the development of their thesis. They posit
97. Id.
98. Malcolm Gladwell, Black Like Them, The New Yorker, Apr. 29, 1996, at 74, http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/1996/04/29/black-like-them [https://perma.cc/MV35-H48E].
Gladwell also discusses long-standing tensions between African Americans and his Jamaican
co-ethnics (borne partly from differential treatment by employers).
99. Id. at 78.
100. See id.; see also Leigh David Benin, The New Labor Radicalism and New York
City’s Garment Industry (Stuart Bruchey, ed. 2000); Herbert Hill, The Untold Story, 69 The
Crisis 513 (Nov. 1962); Robert Laurentz, Racial/Ethnic Conflict in the New York City Gar-
ment Industry 1933-1980 (Apr. 17, 1980) (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, State University of
New York at Binghamton).
101. Gladwell, supra note 98, at 78. This point is made by prominent Harlem Renaissance
intellectual W. A. Domingo. W. A. Domingo, Gift of the Black Tropics, in The New Negro
341, 344–45 (Alain Locke ed., 1968); W. A. Domingo, The Tropics in New York, Survey
Graphic, Mar. 1, 1925, at 648, 649; see also Dennis Forsythe, Black Immigrants and the Ameri-
can Ethos: Theories and Observations, in Caribbean Immigration to the United States 55,
65–66 (Roy S. Bryce Laporte & Delores M. Mortimer eds., 1976) (highlighting the fact that
West Indian immigrants quickly improved their job statuses despite having to start in menial
positions).
102. Brooks & Rose, supra note 57.
103. Id.
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that the persistence of these covenants—even after their enforcement was
outlawed by the Supreme Court—turned less upon their enforceability and
more upon their value in signaling norms of racial exclusivity.104
The connection between Brooks and Rose’s narrative and that of Glad-
well is implicit. A workplace sign saying “no blacks need apply” constitutes a
dignitary affront—the employment equivalent of a racially restrictive cove-
nant. If we argue by analogy to Brooks and Rose, these workplace signs have
a signaling value in employment, just as racially restrictive covenants do in
property. The narratives of West Indian New Yorkers in the 1920s indicate
that, while racial discrimination was rife with signaling (for example, “no
blacks need apply,” “this property may not be sold to Negroes”), West Indi-
ans were still working in, theoretically, racially exclusive factories and living
in, theoretically, racially exclusive neighborhoods.105 The question becomes:
What was so special about West Indians?
One cannot help but wonder whether West Indians had advantages that
helped to mitigate the effects of housing discrimination that were typically
not available to African Americans.106 A primary mitigating effect appears to
have been cash. Maintaining racial exclusivity in certain neighborhoods de-
pended upon white owners maintaining a racial cartel.107 They needed to
uniformly maintain a united front in refusing to sell. Indeed, this is the
problem that Coates highlights: homeowners and realtors were acting in
concert as early as the 1920s, when West Indians began to arrive in New
York in significant numbers, to ensure that racially restrictive covenants were
upheld. Later, when the FHA was established, the federal government joined
homeowners and realtors in maintaining the united front.
This front, however, would be broken with help from West Indian real-
tors. These realtors were the gatekeepers to home ownership for West Indi-
ans in an era when even the realtor sector was segregated.108 They were
experts at finding defectors—namely, whites willing to break norms of racial
exclusivity to extract a premium for selling to blacks. Thus, West Indian
brokers proceeded to buy significant numbers of titles, which were then off-
loaded to fellow West Indians.109 West Indian realtors could act in confi-
dence because they often bought in trust—de facto, if not de jure—for fel-
low West Indians with ready access to cash.110
Where did this cash come from? There is a short-term and a long-term
answer to this question. In the short term, West Indian buyers were more
likely to access informal credit that allowed them to generate cash when
104. Id. at 4–5.
105. See Gladwell, supra note 98, at 74–78.
106. See Vilna Francine Bashi, Survival of the Knitted 182–206 (2007).
107. Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, Why Black Homeowners are More Likely to be Carib-
bean American than African American in New York, in The Blacks Who “Got Their Forty
Acres” 2 (forthcoming) (chapter on file with author).
108. Id. at 6.
109. Id. at 8.
110. Id.
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needed.111 Even when they did not have immediate cash, they had access to
informal mortgage financing.112 A seller should be indifferent if a buyer
needs a mortgage, as long as the mortgage closes sufficiently quickly to pro-
duce cash in short order. Unlike their African American counterparts, West
Indians had such access to mortgage financing, first informally and then
more formally through means such as communal collective savings schemes,
long before such financing formally existed.113 Unsurprisingly, West Indian
agents who bought on behalf of clients with cash had more leverage than
their African American–realtor peers, even when those peers also targeted
defectors.114
In the long term, West Indians proved well-versed in cutting deals, even
in the face of significant dignitary affronts—a skill they learned from their
ancestors.115
At the time of Emancipation, British plantation owners in the West In-
dies were compensated for what was then the most massive taking to date by
the British government: the loss of their property rights in hundreds of
thousands of slave bodies, which occurred when the British Parliament abol-
ished slavery in the Caribbean.116 No such compensation was provided for
the actual slaves, who undoubtedly suffered a massive taking.117 But this is
not the whole story.
The British had permitted—indeed, encouraged—slave property rights
in fact if not in law. They did this by providing grounds to the slaves, often
in the form of minifarms at the edge of the plantations.118 This provision
effectively incentivized owners to take care of their slaves, the backbone of
the plantation workforce.119 These lands were technically owned by their
masters, but they were occupied by slaves rent free, and all of the agricul-
tural proceeds from that land went to the slaves.120 At Emancipation, many
slaves were allowed to keep these provision grounds and continue their rent-
free tenure on the land. One might consider such land access a kind of
rough justice from the British government, given the years of unpaid slave
labor on the plantations.121 The proceeds from their tenure on these lands
111. Id. at 19.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 119–20.
114. Id. at 20.
115. Id. at 31–33.
116. See Legacies of British Slave-Ownership, Project Overview, U. C. London (2016),
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/project/ [https://perma.cc/9UDB-PFVL] (discussing the 20 million
pounds sterling in compensation that was authorized by the British parliament to be paid
from the public purse to former slave owners in the British colonies).
117. See id.
118. See Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, Chapter on the Evolution of Property Ownership
Among Former Slaves, in The Blacks Who “Got Their Forty Acres” 122 (forthcoming)
(chapter on file with author).
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120. Id. at 122–25.
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was significant; this was in many instances highly-productive land, and it
allowed slaves and their descendants to run a profitable trade in
provisions.122
I think that the slaves were onto something with their sense of rough
justice through provision-ground access, although, it surely fell short of
what they were owed.123 But, even so,  the provision-ground access fell far
short of what Atuahene would consider a proper acknowledgement of harm.
To the extent that the process itself is an important component of dignitary
compensation, there was no process a la Atuahene (pp. 3–4, 55, 57–58):
there was no formal accounting of the uncompensated labor that had been
taken from slave bodies, nor was there any acknowledgement of the consid-
erable harm, including dignitary harm, that had been done to the slaves.
Indeed, it would be a stretch to argue that the British viewed their actions as
constituting any form of compensation, since that would have acknowledged
an obligation to compensate—a concession that was never made.
Thus, one can hardly make the case that former West Indian slaves, the
forebears of migrants to the United States, received dignitary compensation.
But many slaves received an equivalent through access to land, even if the
British could not bring themselves to acknowledge the unspeakable indigni-
ties that afforded slaves the land.
Why was land so important, even without the process of which
Atuahene writes? We know from economists that it matters whether for-
merly enslaved people receive land soon after receiving their freedom.124 For-
mer slaves’ chances at building inclusive political institutions are intricately
intertwined with their ability to break down non-inclusive economic institu-
tions.  Access to property helps former slaves do this, independent of their
former masters.125 Because West Indians received land, they were able to
create an independent, landed peasantry with a political-power base inde-
pendent of the landed plantocracy.126
With a landed peasantry, West Indians could insist on inclusive institu-
tions where the property rights of the median resident, not just the property
rights of the elite planter, were respected127—a chance that African Ameri-
cans in the South never had.128 This is largely why Clyde Ross was forced to
flee Jim Crow–era Mississippi, where his father’s land was seized without
compensation. It is why Ross later found himself struggling to acquire prop-
erty in Chicago, where a more subtle, but nevertheless pernicious, kind of
122. See id. at 111.
123. See pp. 164–76.
124. Brown, supra note 118, at 141–42 (summarizing this literature, with particular atten-
tion paid to the work of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson). See also Daron Acemoglu &
James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail 335–67 (2012).
125. See Acemoglu & Robinson, supra note 124, at 357.
126. See Brown, supra note 90, at 59–61.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 60.
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Jim Crow was practiced.129 Moreover, it was this same rough land compen-
sation received by West Indians that allowed their descendants to acquire
assets in the United States decades later—an opportunity that was denied to
their African American counterparts.130
To return to Atuahene, there is little doubt that these West Indians suf-
fered dignitary affronts. During slavery in the West Indies, there were tradi-
tional takings of slaves’ bodies and also the dignitary takings that inevitably
accompanied enslavement. It would be a stretch to say that slaves in the West
Indies received proper, formal compensation—much less dignitary compen-
sation—simply because they were allowed to keep their provision grounds.
But the land mattered. As economists tell the story, the forty acres promised
to African Americans in the aftermath of the Civil War mattered.131 West
Indians received their forty acres; African Americans did not.132
Fast-forward to the twentieth century: even if African Americans had
possessed cash, many of them could have bought homes only in contraven-
tion of racially restrictive covenants. Moreover, when the federal govern-
ment’s support of such covenants was overt, these covenants were no longer
private contractual arrangements; these indignities were government
supported.
Herein lies the lesson of this narrative: even those with cash suffered
dignitary affronts. Whether these affronts were takings is another matter.
Following Coates’s logic, West Indians might have been even better off if
they also had access to federally subsidized loans. For example, in a commu-
nity that was well known for its entrepreneurial bent,133 persons might have
purchased homes with federally supported mortgages while preserving their
cash for business ventures. But in this instance, the opportunity-cost argu-
ment is weaker than it is for similarly situated African Americans. That is,
Coates’s Ross was far worse off, even if his West Indian equivalent also suf-
fered a dignitary affront.
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Conclusion
Coates’s insistence that we need a way to accommodate those who have
always been landless, in part because of opportunities denied to them due to
skin color, is an argument that Atuahene’s notion of “dignity takings” would
do well to address. Moreover, it would broaden the relevance of her argu-
ment, not only within the United States, but also within South Africa, where
clear majorities of blacks never had any quasi-tangible relationship with land
and could not file a claim during any land restitution process. The West
Indian case study also underlines the expansiveness of Atuahene’s argu-
ment—even with a population that had early access to property, questions
of dignity still loom large.
